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Abstract
I propose a di¤erential oligopoly game of resource extraction un-
der (quasi-static) open-loop and nonlinear feedback strategies, where
rms are managerial and two alternative types of delegation contract
are considered. Under open-loop information, delegation expands the
residual steady state resource stock. Conversely, under nonlinear feed-
back information the outcome depends on the structure of managerial
incentives. If sales are used, once again delegation favours resource
preservation. On the contrary, if market shares are included in the
delegation contract, this combines with an underlying voracity e¤ect
in shrinking the steady state volume of the resource.
JEL codes: C73, L13, Q2
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1 Introduction
One of the most debated issue in environmental and resource economics is
the joint exploitation of common pool resources and the related tragedy of
commons.1 Some recent extensions of the literature on this matter exam-
ines the exploitation of a renewable resource in di¤erential oligopoly games
with prot-seeking rms, i.e., pure entrepreneurial units (Benchekroun, 2003,
2008; Fujiwara, 2008, 2011; Colombo and Labrecciosa, 2013, 2015; and Lam-
bertini and Mantovani, 2014). However, casual observation reveals that in
many industries, most of the rms (in particular large ones) are indeed man-
agerial entities in which control is separate from ownership and managers in
charge of determining their respective rmsstrategies receive remunerations
based on combinations of prots and some other magnitudes, such as sales,
revenues or market shares.
Most of the extant literature on strategic delegation (based on Vickers,
1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987; and Fershtman, Judd and
Kalai, 1991) neatly points out that delegation relying on contracts based on
sales or revenues favours output expansion on the part of managers, thereby
making rms more aggressive as compared to what they would be if directly
led by shareholders. This, in turn, produces a more competitive outcome
1See the seminal contributions by Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968). The subsequent
literature includes, among many others, Levhari and Mirman (1980), Clemhout and Wan
(1985), Clark (1990), Benhabib and Radner (1992), Dockner and Sorger (1996), Dawid
and Kopel (1997), Sorger (1998) and Benchekroun and Long (2002), among many others.
Advanced overviews of the early stages of this debate are in Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and
Clark (1990). A recent survey of di¤erential games of resource extraction is in Lambertini
(2013, ch. 9).
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with a lower price and a higher industry output. These results, attained
in static models, are conrmed by the dynamic version of such games, as
in Cellini and Lambertini (2008). One notable exception is Ritz (2008), in
which the managers remuneration is a combination of prots and market
share. In such a case, the outcome is less competitive than that generated
by entrepreneurial rms, all else equal. Hence, there is no a priori presump-
tion that the bearings of separation between ownership and control will be
univocal, when the preservation of a natural resource is at stake.
To examine this issue, I am proposing an extension of the di¤erential
oligopoly game investigated by Benchekroun (2003, 2008), Fujwara (2008)
and Lambertini and Mantovani (2014) to account for two types of delegation
contract, one based on sales, the other based on market shares. After out-
lining the quasi-static outcome generated under open-loop rules, I will set
out to consider feedback ones. Given the nonlinear nature of the managerial
incentive scheme using market shares, I will consider nonlinear feedback rules
only.
The main results of the analysis can be summarised in the following terms.
Under open-loop information, delegation increases the residual resource stock
surviving at the steady state equilibrium, irrespective of whether the con-
tracts use sales or market shares. Instead, under nonlinear feedback rules,
the impact of delegation on the residual stock strictly depends on the spec-
ication of the contract. If it features sales, the consequences of delegation
are qualitatively the same as under open-loop information. Otherwise, if
market shares are used as managerial incentives, the residual stock shrinks
as compared to its surviving volume if rms were run by shareholders.
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This contrasting outcome arising when rules more sophisticated than
open-loop ones are adopted call for an explanation. This can be identi-
ed resorting to the so-called voracity e¤ect (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell
and Lane, 1999) operating for su¢ ciently high levels of the resource growth
rate, whereby higher growth rates lead to lower steady state resource stocks,
because of the resulting hastening of the extraction activity on the part of
rms, combined with the usual pre-emption e¤ect associated with feedback
rules, whose presence has been abundantly stressed in previous research on
di¤erential oligopoly games (see Fershtman and Kamien, 1987; and Reynolds,
1987). Therefore, the use of market share incentives exerts a ywheel e¤ect in
combination with the voracity e¤ect in compromising resource preservation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates
the setup. Open-loop equilibria are illustrated in section 3. Nonlinear feed-
back strategies are dealt with in section 4. Concluding remarks are in section
5.
2 The model
The setup is an extension of Lambertini andMantovani (2014) and Benchekroun
(2008), where a common property productive asset oligopoly is considered,
and encompasses the duopoly model used in Benchekroun (2003) and Fuji-
wara (2008). The model illustrates a di¤erential oligopoly game of resource
extraction unravelling over continuous time t 2 [0;1) : The market is sup-
plied by n rms producing a homogeneous good, whose inverse demand func-
tion is p = a   Q at any time t, with Q = Pni=1 qi. Firms share the same
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technology, characterised by marginal cost c 2 (0; a) ; constant over time.
Firms operate without any xed costs. During production, each rm ex-
ploits a renewable natural resource, whose accumulation is governed by the
following dynamics:

S = F (S) Q (1)
with
F (S) =
8>>>><>>>>:
S 8S 2 (0; Sy]
Sy

Smax   S
Smax   Sy

8S 2 (Sy; Smax]
(2)
where S is the resource stock,  > 0 is its implicit growth rate when the stock
is at most equal to Sy and Sy is the maximum sustainable yield. Taken
together, (1-2) imply that (i) if the resource stock is su¢ ciently small the
population grows at an exponential rate; and (ii) beyond Sy, the asset grows
at a decreasing rate. Moreover, Smax is the carrying capacity of the habitat,
beyond which the growth rate of the resource is negative, being limited by
available amounts of food and space. In the remainder, we will conne our
attention to the case in which F (S) = S.
Firms play noncooperatively and choose their respective outputs simulta-
neously at every instant. At t = 0; each rm hires a manager whose contract
species the instantaneous objective which the manager has to maximise.
Contracts are observable. I will consider here two alternatives:
 Type-I contract. As in Vickers (1985), the instantaneous objective
function of manager i is a linear combination of prots and output:2
Mi = i + qi ;  > 0 (3)
2This contract is equivalent to that considered in Fershtman and Judd (1987), where
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In the remainder, I will treat  as a constant for the sake of simplicity. It
is worth noting that this type of contract implies that, through delega-
tion, the owners intend to a¤ect the managers perception of marginal
cost, inducing the latter to act as if his rms marginal cost were in-
deed lower than c. To appreciate how this sort of technological illusion
operates, it su¢ ces to observe that (3) can be rewritten as follows:
Mi = i + qi = (a Q  c+ ) qi = (a Q  bc) qi (4)
where bc = c   . Hence, one could say that the manager behave as if
he were maximising the prot function i = (a Q  bc) qi, associated
to a rm endowed with a more e¢ cient technology. In a similar way,
one could say that any  > 0 induces the manager to behave as if the
reservation price were higher than it actually is, say, A = a+: Be that
as it may, this contract induces the output expansion constituting the
core of Vickers model of strategic delegation.
 Type-II contract. As in Ritz (2008), the instantaneous objective
function of manager i is a linear combination of prots and market
share:
Mi = i + 
qi
Q
;  2

0; b ; (5)
b  (a  c)2 (   nr)2
4r (n  1) [2   r (n+ 1)]
Also in this case, I will treat  as a constant. Here, however,  does not
simply modify the managers perception of marginal production cost,
because of the nonlinear form of the delegation contract.
the maximand is a weighted average of prots and revenues, Mi = i + (1  )Ri;
Ri = pqi. A proof of the equivalence is in Lambertini and Trombetta (2002).
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In either setting, the i-th manager maximises the following discounted
payo¤ ow
i =
Z 1
0
Mie
 rtdt; (6)
under the constraint posed by the state equation

S = S  Q (7)
Parameter r > 0 is the discount rate, common to all managers and con-
stant over time. Obviously, if  =  = 0; rms are pure prot-seeking
entrepreneurial units and the two cases coincide.
The analysis will be carried out under the following assumption:
Assumption 1  > nr:
This guarantees the positivity of the residual resource stock at the steady
state under feedback rules. That is, in the remainder I will leave the possi-
bility of resource exhaustion due to an excessively large number of rms out
of the picture, in order to focus solely on the e¤ects of delegation.3
If rms dont internalise the consequences of their behaviour at any time
and play the individual (static) Cournot-Nash output qCN = (a  c) = (n+ 1)
at all times, then the residual amount of the natural resource in steady state
is SCN = n (a  c) = [ (n+ 1)] = QCN=: For future reference, it is worth
noting that the static solution corresponds to the open-loop steady state
one, which in this game is unstable (see Figure 1 in Fujiwara, 2008, p. 218;
3The analysis of this specic aspect in the corresponding model without any form of
delegation can be found in Lambertini and Mantovani (2014, pp. 119-21).
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and Lambertini, 2013, p. 240). The initial condition is S (0) = S0; with
S0 > max
8<:n (a  c+ ) (n+ 1) ; n (a  c) +
q
n2 (a  c)2 + 4 (n2   1)
2 (n+ 1) 
9=; (8)
where
n (a  c+ )
 (n+ 1)
>
n (a  c) +
q
n2 (a  c)2 + 4 (n2   1)
2 (n+ 1) 
for all
 2

0;
n3 (a  c+ ) [(a  c) (n  1) + n]
n2   1

(9)
while the opposite applies outside this interval. Condition (8) su¢ ces to
guarantee S > 0 at all times under the static Cournot-Nash strategies.
3 Open-loop equilibria
In either case, since the present game is a linear state one, the open-loop
solution is subgame perfect (or strongly time consistent) as it yields a degen-
erate feedback equilibrium.4 It remains true, however, that under open-loop
information rms do not internalise the impact of their activities on the
productive asset being exploited.
3.1 Type-I contract
Under a delegation contract à la Vickers (1985), the current-value Hamil-
tonian of rm i is:
Hi = (p  c+ ) qi + i

S =
4For more on the arising of strongly time consistent equilibria in di¤erential games
solved under open-loop information, see Fershtman (1987), Mehlmann (1988, ch. 4),
Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 7) and Cellini et al. (2005).
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= (  Q)qi + i (S  Q) (10)
where   a  c+  > 0 denotes the measure of market size as perceived by
the manager of rm i.
The necessary conditions (FOCs) are:
@Hi
@qi
=    2qi  Q i   i = 0; (11)
where Q i 
P
j 6=i qj, and the adjoint equation reads as follows:

i = (r   )i (12)
which reveals that i = 0 at all times is an admissible solution. This illus-
trates that rms do not care about the consequences of their activities on
the resource stock and behave in a quasi-static way all over the time horizon
of the game, playing the optimal output associated with the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium (CN) at any time t; which can be directly obtained by imposing
the symmetry condition qi = q for all i and then solve the FOC (11):
qCNI =

n+ 1
(13)
where subscript I indicates the structure of the delegation contract.
The resulting steady state stock is
SCNI =
nqCNI

=
n
(n+ 1) 
(14)
Now observe that
@SCNI
@
=
@SCNI
@
=
n
(n+ 1) 
> 0 (15)
This implies:
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Lemma 1 Under a type-I contract and open-loop (quasi-static) rules, any
increase in the extent of delegation increases the residual stock of resources
in steady state, all else equal.
3.2 Type-II contract
Assume now the contract o¤ered to managers is à la Ritz (2008). If so, the
Hamiltonian of manager i looks as follows:
Hi = (p  c) qi + qi
Q
+ i

S =
=

a  c Q  
Q

qi + i (S  Q) (16)
Once again, the game exhibits a linear state structure, and therefore the
open-loop solution is subgame perfect. The necessary conditions (FOCs)
are:
@Hi
@qi
= a  c  2qi  Q i   i + Q i
Q2
= 0; (17)
where Q i 
P
j 6=i qj, and the adjoint equation reads as follows:

i = (r   )i (18)
Using the same procedure as in the previous case, we may set i = 0; impose
symmetry on output levels across the population of rms and solve the rst
order condition to obtain:
qCNII =
n (a  c) +
q
n2 (a  c)2 + 4 (n2   1)
2n (n+ 1)
> 0 (19)
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everywhere.5 The resulting steady state stock of the natural resource is
SCNII =
nqCNII

=
n (a  c) +
q
n2 (a  c)2 + 4 (n2   1)
2 (n+ 1) 
(20)
Once again, it is apparent that @SCNII =@ > 0; which entails:
Lemma 2 Under a type-II contract and open-loop (quasi-static) rules, any
increase in the extent of delegation increases the residual stock of resources
in steady state, all else equal.
In summary, the message delivered by the quasi-static open-loop formu-
lation of the game is that the myopia associated with such rules, combined
with managerial delegation, has positive consequences on the preservation of
the natural resource, and in fact it is amplied by delegation. Additionally,
this holds for any number of rms, that is, SCNI and S
CN
II are strictly positive
for all n.
4 Nonlinear feedback equilibria
Since a type-II contract gives rise to a nonlinear problem due to the form
of the managerial objective, for the sake of comparability I will concentrate
on nonlinear feedback strategies in both cases, following Tsutsui and Mino
(1990), Shimomura (1991), Fujiwara (2008) and Lambertini and Mantovani
(2014). Again, my attention will be restricted to symmetric equilibria.
5The alternative root can be disregarded as it is negative over the entire parameter
range.
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4.1 Type-I contract
This case can be quickly dealt with, as it is a relatively straightforward
generalisation of the setup investigated in Lambertini and Mantovani (2014).
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation writes as:
rVi (S) = max
qi
[(a  c+   Q) qi + V 0i (S) (S  Q)] (21)
where Vi (S) is the rm is value function; and V 0i (S) = @Vi (S) =@S: The
rst order condition (FOC) on qi is
a  c+    2qi  
X
j 6=i
qj   V 0i (S) = 0 (22)
In view of the ex ante symmetry across rms, we impose the condition
qj = qi = q (S) and solve the FOC (22) to obtain V 0(S) = a   c +    (n +
1)q (S) : Substituting this into (21) yields an identity in S. Di¤erentiating
both sides with respect to S and rearranging terms, any feedback strategy is
implicitly given by the following di¤erential equation:
q0(S) =
(   r) [a  c     (n  1) q (S)]
(a  c  ) (n  1) + (n+ 1)S   2n2q (S) ; (23)
which must hold together with terminal condition lim t!1e rtV (s) = 0.
To characterise nonlinear feedback strategies one has to choose, in the
space (S; q (S)) ; the specic solution identied by the tangency point between
the curve describing output q (S) and the line

S = 0 (cf. Fujiwara, 2008, p.
218). As a rst step, observe that, along

S = 0; q (S) = =n; while at
the tangency point, q0(S) = =n. Using this two expressions, (23) can be
rewritten as follows:

n
=
(   r) [a  c      (n  1)S=n]
(a  c  ) (n  1) + (n+ 1)S   2n2S=n (24)
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The above equation can be solved w.r.t. S, to obtain
SNLFI =
(a  c+ ) (   nr)
 [2   r (n+ 1)] =
nqNLFI

(25)
with SNLFI > 0 under Assumption 1,
6 and @SNLFI =@ > 0 in the entire para-
meter range in which SNLFI is positive.
7 As expected, it is easily checked that
(21-25) coincide with the corresponding expressions appearing in Lambertini
and Mantovani (2014, section 3.2, pp. 118-19) if rms are entrepreneurial
units, i.e.,  = 0:
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Lemma 3 Under a type-I delegation contract and nonlinear feedback rules,
any increase in the extent of delegation increases the residual stock of re-
sources in steady state, for all n > max f1; =rg.
So far, the analysis of the resource exploitation game seems to consis-
tently conrm that delegation is benecial in terms of the preservation of the
resource itself in steady state, even considering strategies more sophisticated
than those associated with open-loop information. This, however, is a de-
ceptive impression generated by the simplistic delegation structure based on
output expansion, as we are about to see by examining the incentive contract
based on market shares.
6Note that nr > (n+ 1) r=2 for all n; r > 0.
7The initial amount of resource must be lower than SNLF in order for q

NLF to be an
equilibrium strategy (see Itaya and Shimomura, 2001; Rubio and Casino, 2002).
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4.2 Type-II contract
If managerial incentives relies on market shares, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation of rm i is the following:
rVi (S) = max
qi

(a  c Q) qi + qi
Q
+ V 0i (S) (S  Q)

(26)
The rst derivative w.r.t. qi; under the symmetry condition qi = q (S) for
all i, is:
a  c  (n+ 1) q (S)  V 0 (S) +  (n  1)
n2q (S)
= 0 (27)
which delivers
V 0 (S) =
n2 [a  c  (n+ 1) q (S)] q (S)   (n  1)
n2q (S)
(28)
After substituting the above expression into (26) and di¤erentiating w.r.t.
S; we have:
q0 (S) =
(   r) q (S) [ (n  1) + n2q (S) (a  c  (n+ 1) q (S))]
 (n  1)S + n2q2 (S) [(a  c) (n  1) +  (n+ 1)S   2n2q (S)]
(29)
In correspondence of the tangency point associated with the nonlinear
solution, q (S) = S=n and q0 (S) = =n; so that (29) can be rewritten as
follows:
 (n+ 1) r    [(a  c) (   nr) +  ((n+ 1) r   2)S]S
n (n+ 1) [ (a  c  S)S + ] = 0 (30)
whose roots are
S =
(a  c) (   nr)
q
(a  c)2 (   nr)2   4 (n  1) r [2   (n+ 1) r]
2 [2   (n+ 1) r]
(31)
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The smaller solution, S , can be disregarded for two equally relevant reasons.
The rst is that, if delegation were not adopted (i.e.,  = 0), S  = 0, which
does not solve (2) under the assumption of nonlinear feedback strategies. The
second, perhaps equally if not more compelling, is that setting  =  = 0
must yield the solution attained by Lambertini and Mantovani (2014, eq.
(19), p. 119) for pure prot-seeking entrepreneurial rms, which happens
only if one takes S+: Accordingly, the steady state equilibrium resource stock
under nonlinear feedback rules and managerial incentives based on market
shares is
SNLFII =
(a  c) (   nr) +
q
(a  c)2 (   nr)2   4 (n  1) r [2   (n+ 1) r]
2 [2   (n+ 1) r]
(32)
which belongs to R+ for all  2

0; bi and  > nr:
The above expression exhibits the following property:
@SNLFII
@
=  
(n  1) r
q
(a  c)2 (   nr)2   4 (n  1) r [2   (n+ 1) r]


(a  c)2 (   nr)2   4 (n  1) r (2   (n+ 1) r) < 0
(33)
for all n > 1; which can be spelled out in the following:
Lemma 4 Under a type-II delegation contract and nonlinear feedback rules,
any increase in the extent of delegation decreases the residual stock of re-
sources in steady state, for all  2

0; bi and  > nr.
Jointly considering Lemmas 3 and 4 reveals that feedback rules (in this
case, nonlinear ones) have opposite implications depending on the incentive
scheme being specied by rmsowners in the contract o¤ered to their man-
agers.
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The results appearing in Lemmata 3-4 have some relevant bearings on the
discussion about the so-called voracity e¤ect (see Lane and Tornell, 1996; and
Tornell and Lane, 1999), which can be briey summarised by saying that, in
principle, one would expect that the higher the resource growth rate is, the
higher should be volume of that resource in steady state. However, this may
not hold true as rms respond to any increase in the growth rate by hastening
resource extraction, whereby one observes that @S=@ < 0 in steady state, at
least for su¢ ciently high levels of . The arising of such voracity e¤ect has
been highlighted, with pure prot-seeking units, in Benchekroun (2008) and
Lambertini and Mantovani (2014). In particular, Lambertini and Mantovani
(2014, p. 121) show that under nonlinear feedback information the voracity
e¤ect operates if, in absence of any form of delegation,
 > r
"
n+
r
n (n+ 1)
2
#
(34)
with the expression on the r.h.s. of (34) being higher than nr. Here, the
presence of two di¤erent types of managerial delegation has opposite e¤ects
also in relation with the voracity e¤ect, since the following holds:
Proposition 5 If delegation is based on the sales volume (as in Vickers,
1985), then managerial incentives soften the voracity e¤ect, if the latter op-
erates. If instead delegation is based on market shares (as in Ritz, 2008), then
managerial incentives amplify the voracity e¤ect, when the latter is operating,
or replace it if it is not present.
It is now worth looking back at the open-loop solution to note that, at the
resulting quasi-static Cournot equilibrium, both types of delegation mitigate
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the voracity e¤ect. Put di¤erently, one could say that a linear delegation
scheme softens any underlying voracity e¤ect irrespective of the informational
content underpinning rmsstrategies. It is only when nonlinear delegation
contracts and more sophisticated rules are adopted that a synergy between
delegation and voracity appears. This, indeed, is in line with the acquired
wisdom holding that feedback rules make agents more aggressive, each one
trying to pre-empt the rivals.8
A last remark is in order. The foregoing analysis appears to imply that
the specic design of delegation contracts proposed to managers is of public
interest not only for the usual reasons connected with consumer surplus and
prots but also for (perhaps more far-reaching) motives dealing with the
impact of the separation between ownership and control on resource (and
species) preservation.
5 Concluding remarks
I have investigated the implications of the separation between ownership
and control in a di¤erential oligopoly game where rms exploit a renewable
resource over an innite horizon. Two alternative structures of the delega-
tion contract have been considered, either à la Vickers (1985), whereby each
manager maximises an objective consisting in a weighted sum of prot and
output, or prots and market share à la Ritz (2008).
The foregoing analysis has shown that while under open-loop strategies
8This idea is pervasive in the literature treating di¤erential oligopoly games with quan-
tity competition (Driskill and McCa¤erty, 1989); capacity accumulation (Reynolds, 1987,
1991); sticky prices (Fershtman and Kamien, 1987; Cellini and Lambertini, 2004).
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delegation favours the preservation of the resource in steady state, under
nonlinear feedback rules this applies only to linear contracts à la Vickers
(1985), because the e¤ect of delegation in such a case is equivalent to either
an increase in market size or a decrease in marginal cost, and therefore any
increase in the extent of delegation has a positive impact on the residual
volume of the natural resource surviving at the steady state. Conversely,
the contract based on market shares appears to exert a negative impact on
the same magnitude, acting as a ywheel in an undesirable synergy with the
voracity e¤ect originally singled out by Lane and Tornell (1996). The pol-
icy implication stemming from these ndings is that a public environmental
agency should pay the due attention to the internal organization of rms
heavily involved in the exploitation of key resources, when regulating access
to such resources.
18
References
[1] Benchekroun, H. (2003). Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic
duopoly. Journal of Economic Theory 111, 214-39.
[2] Benchekroun, H. (2008). Comparative dynamics in a productive asset
oligopoly. Journal of Economic Theory 138, 237-61.
[3] Benchekroun, H. and Long, N.V. (2002). Transboundary shery: a dif-
ferential game model. Economica 69, 207-21.
[4] Benhabib, J. and Radner, R. (1992). The joint exploitation of productive
asset: a game-theoretic approach. Economic Theory 2, 155-90.
[5] Cellini, R. and Lambertini, L. (2004). Dynamic oligopoly with sticky
prices: closed-loop, feedback and open-loop solutions. Journal of Dy-
namical and Control Systems 10, 303-14.
[6] Cellini, R. and Lambertini, L. (2008). Product and process innovation in
di¤erential games with managerial rms, in R. Cellini and L. Lambertini
(eds), The Economics of Innovation: Incentives, Cooperation, and R&D
Policy, Bingley, Emerald Publishing, 159-76.
[7] Cellini, R., Lambertini, L. and Leitmann, G. (2005). Degenerate feed-
back and time consistency in di¤erential games, in E.P. Hofer and E.
Reithmeier (eds), Modeling and Control of Autonomous Decision Sup-
port Based Systems. Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop on
Dynamics and Control, Aachen, Shaker Verlag, 185-92.
19
[8] Clark, C.W. (1990). Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Man-
agement of Renewable Resources, New York, Wiley.
[9] Clemhout, S. and Wan Jr., H. (1985). Dynamic common property re-
sources and environmental problems. Journal of Optimization Theory
and Applications 46, 471-81.
[10] Colombo, L. and Labrecciosa, P. (2013). Oligopoly exploitation of a
private property productive asset. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 37, 838-53.
[11] Colombo, L. and Labrecciosa, P. (2015). On the Markovian e¢ ciency
of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory 155,
322-58.
[12] Dasgupta, P.S. and G.M. Heal (1979), Economic Theory and Ex-
haustible Resources, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
[13] Dawid, H. and Kopel, M. (1997). On the economically optimal exploita-
tion of a renewable resource: the case of a convex environment and a
convex return function. Journal of Economic Theory 76, 272-97.
[14] Dockner, E.J., Jørgensen, S., Long, N.V. and Sorger, G. (2000). Dif-
ferential Games in Economics and Management Science, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
[15] Dockner, E.J. and Sorger, G. (1996). Existence and properties of equi-
libria for a dynamic game on productive assets. Journal of Economic
Theory 171, 201-27.
20
[16] Driskill, R. and McCa¤erty, S. (1989). Dynamic duopoly with adjust-
ment costs: A di¤erential game approach. Journal of Economic Theory,
49, 324-38.
[17] Fershtman, C. (1987). Identication of classes of di¤erential games for
which the open-loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium, Journal
of Optimization Theory and Applications, 55, 217-31.
[18] Fershtman, C. and Judd, K. (1987). Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly.
American Economic Review, 77, 927-40.
[19] Fershtman, C., Judd, K. and Kalai, E. (1991). Observable contracts,
strategic delegation and cooperation. International Economic Review,
32, 551-59.
[20] Fershtman, C. and Kamien, M. (1987). Dynamic duopolistic competition
with sticky prices. Econometrica 55, 1151-64.
[21] Fujiwara, K. (2008). Duopoly can be more anti-competitive than
monopoly. Economics Letters 101, 217-19.
[22] Fujiwara, K. (2011). Losses from competition in a dynamic game model
of a renewable resource oligopoly. Resource and Energy Economics, 33,
1-11.
[23] Gordon, H.S. (1954). The economic theory of a common-property re-
source: the shery. Journal of Political Economy, 62, 124-42.
[24] Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science 162, 1243-48.
21
[25] Itaya, J. and Shimomura, K. (2001). A dynamic conjectural variations
model in the private provision of public goods: a di¤erential game ap-
proach. Journal of Public Economics 81, 153-72.
[26] Lambertini, L. (2013). Oligopoly, the Environment and Natural Re-
sources, London, Routledge.
[27] Lambertini, L. and Mantovani, A. (2014). Feedback equilibria in a dy-
namic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, voracity and exhaus-
tion, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 47, 115-22.
[28] Lambertini, L. and Trombetta, M. (2002). Delegation and rmsability
to collude. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 47, 359-73.
[29] Lane, P.R. and Tornell, A. (1996). Power, growth, and the voracity
e¤ect. Journal of Economic Growth 1, 213-41.
[30] Levhari. D. and Mirman, L. (1980). The great sh war: an example
using a dynamic Cournot-Nash solution, Bell Journal of Economics 11,
322-34.
[31] Mehlmann, A. (1988). Applied Di¤erential Games, New York, Plenum
Press.
[32] Reynolds, S. (1987). Preemption and commitment in an innite horizon
model. International Economic Review 28, 69-88.
[33] Reynolds, S. (1991). Dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 15, 491-514.
22
[34] Ritz, R. (2008). Strategic incentives for market share. International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization, 26, 586-97.
[35] Rubio, S.J., and Casino, B. (2002). A note on cooperative versus non-
cooperative strategies in international pollution control. Resource and
Energy Economics 24, 251-61.
[36] Shimomura, K. (1991). The feedback equilibria of a di¤erential game of
capitalism. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 15, 317-38.
[37] Sklivas, S. (1987). The strategic choice of management incentives.
RAND Journal of Economics, 18, 452-58.
[38] Sorger, G. (1998). Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource
games. Economic Theory 11, 79-100.
[39] Tornell, A. and Lane, P.R. (1999). The voracity e¤ect. American Eco-
nomic Review 89, 22-46.
[40] Tsutsui, S., and Mino, K. (1990). Nonlinear strategies in dynamic
duopolistic competition with sticky prices. Journal of Economic The-
ory 52, 136-61.
[41] Vickers, J. (1985). Delegation and the theory of the rm. Economic
Journal (Conference Supplement), 95, 138-47.
23
 
